EXHIBIT A

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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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4	INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS & :
5	TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., : Civil Action No. Plaintiffs, 1:16-cv-10386-LTS
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7	· : HEWLETT-PACKARD FINANCIAL SERVICES
8	COMPANY, et al.,
9	Defendants. :
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12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEO T. SOROKIN, DISTRICT JUDGE
13	MOTION HEARING
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16	Wednesday, February 10, 2021 3:33 p.m.
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19	John J. Moakley United States Courthouse One Courthouse Way
20	Boston, Massachusetts
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22	Rachel M. Lopez, CRR
23	Official Court Reporter One Courthouse Way, Suite 5209
24	Boston, Massachusetts 02210 raeufp@gmail.com
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APPEARANCES 1 2 On behalf of the Plaintiffs: 3 OUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN BY: LUKE NIKAS AND ALEX S. ZUCKERMAN 4 51 Madison Avenue 5 22nd Floor New York, New York 10010 (212) 849-7000 6 lukenikas@quinnemanuel.com alexzuckerman@quinnemanuel.com 7 8 On behalf of the Defendants: 9 GIBBONS, P.C. 10 BY: PAUL A. SASO AND ANTHONY P. CALLAGHAN One Pennsylvania Plaza 11 37th Floor New York, New York 10119 12 (212) 613-2015 13 acallaghan@gibbonslaw.com 14 CHOATE HALL & STEWART LLP BY: MICHAEL H. BUNIS, KEVIN C. QUIGLEY, 15 AND G. MARK EDGARTON Two International Place 16 100-150 International Place Boston, Massachusetts 02110 17 (617) 248-4030 mbunis@choate.com 18 kquigley@choate.com medgarton@choate.com 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

PROCEEDINGS

(In open court.)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts is now in session, the Honorable Leo T. Sorokin presiding.

Today is February 10th, the case of Integrated Communications v. Hewlett Packard Financial Service, civil action 16-10386, will now appear before this Court.

Counsel, please identify themselves for the record.

MR. NIKAS: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Luke Nikas from Quinn Emanuel. And I'm here with my associated, Alex Zuckerman, on behalf of the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. BUNIS: Your Honor, Michael Bunis on behalf of the defendants. And with me are Mark Edgarton and Kevin Quigley from Choate Hall.

MR. SASO: And Your Honor, Paul Saso from Gibbons, PC, on behalf of the defendants. And also with me from Gibbons is Anthony Callaghan.

THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon.

MR. EDGARTON: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: So I thought I would -- I scheduled this status conference. I thought it would be useful to sort of cut to the chase on certain issues that seemed to be dividing the parties and to keep the case moving on track.

Because if one thing is not clear in this case, I think it's clear to all of you, but is that I very much intend to keep this case on track for the trial that I scheduled.

So I thought I'd just run through and make some observations about each -- I think there are four issues that are raised, touched upon in the parties' filings, and recent filings, either the motion filed by the defendant -- by the plaintiffs, rather, or the request for a status conference and response by the parties. So -- and ordering not representing anything in particular, I'll address them first, talking about the expert report. So -- okay.

So just to summarize, the -- under the schedule that we have, the plaintiffs were to make medical expert disclosures on January 29th, and they made a medical expert disclosure of a doctor's report. I know I've read the e-mails that you submitted back between the parties. I know there's some dissatisfaction by the defendants with that report. So let me sort of step back and make these general observations of the case, and then I'll talk about that.

This is the lens through which I'm viewing the case here as follows: The case was brought in 2016. It had a phased process that was agreed upon -- proposed by the parties, both parties, and agreed upon by the Court. That phased process involved paper discovery, once we are done with the motion to dismiss practice, on all issues.

When we were done with paper discovery, there was going to be summary judgment on the narrow question of whether the goods sold were counterfeit or not when sold. Then after that, there would be deposition discovery and then experts, and then quite possibly another summary judgment round on other issues, other than the counterfeit.

That was the proposal. That was the plan. That was what was executed. That was what was memorialized unambiguously by me in writing, the orders that I issued in the summer of 2020, which made clear that paper discovery was over, that all discovery was over, except discovery that the Court specifically authorized. And so there were various depositions, and there were depositions just for the defendant because the plaintiff hadn't asked for any. But then the plaintiff, late, asked for them, and the Court authorized, by and large, the depositions that the plaintiff asked for.

So that schedule was going along. We had a trial date that the schedule was built around. New counsel came in, which was you, Mr. Nikas, and the other people from your firm.

And after -- as I see it, after you were in the case for a little while, the plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel came to the Court with a -- what seemed to be a carefully thought-out proposal for revising the schedule.

The proposal provided — did not provide for going back, for redoing anything. It provided for some additional time to complete the depositions that were then in process, and it provided for a carefully crafted schedule for experts, medical experts, the Rule 35 examinations, the nonmedical experts, summary judgment, and then trial.

Each of those things related to each other, among other things, as I think I observed in one of the orders, that the defendants wanted the expert reports for their summary judgment motion. This was the less common case where even damage experts might reasonably bear on summary judgment motions.

I spent a fair bit of time talking to counsel about the schedule. I had two status conferences before, and I issued a written order in response to the joint request to adopt this revised schedule.

I did adopt this schedule. I adopted it exactly as you proposed, with all the dates you proposed, adding only to it a specific date for trial at the end, accounting for both a prompt, but reasonable, period of time for me to resolve the summary judgment motion, and some additional time after that for you all to make all the necessary pretrial findings.

So I come to that with that tightly integrated and crafted schedule that I very much intend to adhere to. I have no plans other than your trial, for the time that I

scheduled this case for trial in February 2022, and I do not intend to schedule any other cases for trial at that time. I'm not double-booking this case. This is the only case on for trial at that time and it's my intention to try the case at that time, unless for some reason summary judgment resolved it, or something else. But I'm planning and anticipating, and that's what we do.

So then that brings me back to the medical expert report. Defendants -- I'm sorry, plaintiffs, in their e-mails, point out or contend that this is -- that the report that they produced does comply with the requirements of disclosure under the federal rules of civil procedure, and I think facially I agree with that. I know that's not fully joined, but when I read the report, it's a report that contains an opinion; the opinion, among others, that, generally, incarceration, especially of an innocent person, can cause physical and emotional harm to people. That's an opinion. And it's an opinion that has an articulated basis in it that there are reasons that the expert explained for this opinion, and there are the reasons for it.

The expert explained his credentials — and I think it's a him. And in any event, the expert explained the credentials and the reasoning. And I don't say that to mean to say that if it were a challenge under *Daubert* or something else, that I would necessarily reject it, but on first

glance, it doesn't seem like it facially meets the dots of Rule 26.

That said, there are two other things that are quite obvious about that report, both of which -- and credit to the expert, he's quite candid about. First, he doesn't really render any opinions about the damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs; that he says that he's going to interview and examine them, and he's going to administer -- consider administering a range of evaluation -- of psychological tests and measures on them, after which he's likely -- what seems obvious, whether it's expressly stated or not in the report, he's likely to render additional opinions about these people and with additional reasons for those opinions about those people.

So I'm not -- I guess the way I think about this is this. The doctor can do whatever the doctor wishes to do. He can interview any people he wants to. I'm not issuing an injunction against this doctor, preventing him from doing anything he wants to do. He can interview people. He can render reports. He can do this case. He can work on -- he can talk to the counsel for plaintiffs in this case about whatever he wants. He can talk to -- he can do other cases. It's a free country. He can do whatever he wants.

But from my perspective, the report that he issued that the plaintiffs timely served on January 29th, that's the

report that's their expert report that triggers the next things in the schedule. This is a -- this is a carefully crafted schedule that, with each piece of the schedule integrated with all the other components, the components that came before and the components that come after, it's a schedule that reasonably provides sufficient time for everyone to accomplish what they need to accomplish at each stage. That's determined -- all of you weighed in on that, because it's the schedule that you proposed; and after careful and searching examination, based upon my extensive knowledge of the case and my experience, I concurred and I adopted.

And so that's what is the schedule -- that is the report I think, Mr. Bunis, to which triggers the next thing.

Now, there is another issue, which is that it seems quite likely that this expert might choose to issue another report. Nothing stops him from writing whatever he wants to write. But I will tell you that I'm -- that that report is not before me and that report is not in the case, because the deadline was January 29th. The report was served. That's the report that's in the case as the expert report for the plaintiffs. That deadline was clear. That deadline was established well after -- not a long time, but well after the experienced plaintiffs' counsel came into the case, presumably after having a sufficient time to evaluate the

case, consider. They crafted a schedule after negotiation with the defendants. I infer that that schedule was -- what was considered was all the things that needed to go into that schedule, needed to be done.

Nobody came to me for a continuance beforehand. No one has asked me for a continuance now. And — or no continuance was asked for in response to the status report raising these things. So that's the report. That's the report to which you respond. That triggers each of the next stages of things that we're going to do in the case, and we move forward from there.

If the plaintiffs decide that they get a report from their expert and they want that report to be the report in this case, then you need to make a motion to the Court to explain to me why that report should be the motion -- should be the report in the case. And you'll -- I'm confident, if you think that such a motion is warranted, you'll make it.

But I have to tell you, I'm disinclined -- you told me that there would be no continuances. I took that to mean that you carefully considered the case and the schedule, and all that was entailed, and that we wouldn't need to do that. And so I'm not precluding anything, because there's no motion to preclude anything and there's nothing to preclude at the moment. I'm telling you my perspective about the case and the schedule.

So I should say, related to that, I come to the second point, which is supplement --

The plaintiffs made supplemental disclosures on -- was it on January 29th, I think. Is that right?

MR. NIKAS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: January 29th, which was the last day of fact discovery as the -- and that, too, the defendants have, in general, I think it would be fair to say, complained about, with respect to the fact that those supplemental disclosures identify certain people as people with knowledge who weren't previously identified by the plaintiffs in the case.

I think that the defendants are correct that at this point they haven't offered these people as witnesses at trial; they haven't offered them -- affidavits from them in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; that you have an ongoing duty to supplement, and they feel that those are the people, after their careful review of the case, that they decided were people that they needed to disclose in ordered to discharge their duty under the rules to supplement. And that's fine.

But what I do observe about this case is what all of the observations I made about the expert with respect to the schedule applies here equally. And so I'm not barring anybody from supplementing their disclosures, and I'm not

barring, at the moment, anybody. But again, people who were disclosed at the end of the day, on the last day of fact discovery as new witnesses, in this context that I've described, I'm -- you know, I'm disinclined to think that it's fair to allow them to submit affidavits or testify at trial. I'm not precluding them. If a motion is made to --

There was a reference to having them be deposed —well, you could just depose them now. So no, that's not really correct for the following reasons. One, there are no depositions in this case without prior court permission. That was established and settled in this case in the summer of 2020, at least, if not earlier. It was reiterated then. The reason for that was because this case needs to come to resolution and go to trial, and so the Court is supervising the discovery to be sure that this case actually reaches trial. And it will reach trial.

And the reason I adjusted the schedule in response to the appearance of new counsel was both counsel made reasonable arguments to the Court that — not that anything that was done needed to be redone; no one suggested that. The schedule didn't call for that and I did not authorize that, but rather that the things that were left that remained to be done would be better done and fairer to the plaintiffs and fairer to the defendants if there was a little bit more time allowed for each of those things, so that they could be

done well and right, especially -- and the parties persuaded me that simultaneous, for example, summary judgment -- doing summary judgment simultaneously with experts wasn't appropriate in this case for reasons I've already referred to.

So I'm -- so if a motion is filed to me, why those were late and what should be authorized about them or not, am I going to read it? Of course. Am I going to consider it fairly and carefully? Of course. But I think you all need to understand that this was a carefully crafted, integrated schedule that no one asked me and -- to reopen anything that happened. It was a schedule to address only those things that were left. We're not going -- no one is asking me to go back, and I am disinclined to go back and redo anything, especially when this sort of structure of the case was, in my mind, set long ago, and then which was that we would do all the paper discovery and then sort of this bifurcated summary judgment process with depositions and so forth occurring in between. So that's my view on the new, if you will, people disclosed.

That leads to a third point, which is defendant served written discovery at the end of — the end of December — I'm sorry, I have that wrong. The plaintiff served additional written discovery the end of December, the document requests, interrogatories, at least. I'm not sure

if there was anything else. As I understand the status of that, the defendants objected to that, pointed to, among other things, my orders, Docket No. 372, referring to no further discovery, except as authorized by the Court, in a prior order, which said the paper written discovery was done. And that, as far as I know, nothing further has happened with respect to that discovery at this point.

Defendants correctly point out that they haven't moved to compel, and there's nothing before the Court with respect to that. And I think that's an accurate statement. They have -- I have the complaint of the defendants, but there's no -- there's -- they haven't come to me --

I'm sorry, I'm getting the plaintiffs and the defendants mixed up. Let me start over.

The plaintiffs are correct in pointing out that there's no motion to compel pending before me, they haven't filed one, and that all that's before me is defendants' request for status conference, in which they worry or anticipate that such a motion to compel might be filed.

And so I will tell you, even though it's not before me in the sense of a joined motion with respect to the discovery, the reason that I bring it up here is twofold.

One is, I don't think you can serve, in this case, written discovery at this stage of the case, or at any point since you've entered the case, the lawyers at Quinn Emanuel,

because I previously believe -- I believe I ordered that all written discovery was over and no discovery could occur other than that which I authorized, which is the deposition that we talked about and the experts that are coming.

So I think that if -- so from my perspective, I guess for the defendants, you don't need to respond to that request, because that request was not a proper request in this case.

If to you, Mr. Nikas, to the extent you think you want to have written discovery, you think that written discovery is appropriate in the case, then what you need to do is file a motion with the Court for leave to serve the written discovery, explaining to me what it is, the discovery you want, why that, notwithstanding the schedule, and what have you, you think that whatever it is that you're seeking to be appropriate, and then I would look at that and I would carefully consider it.

That leads me to the last issue, which is the Rule 35, the location of the Rule 35 medical examinations. So just to recap, that had been in the offing for a long time. At the moment, where it stood — where it stands in the most recent history is in the order that adjusted and extended the schedule and set the trial in February of 2022, I said that those Rule 35 examinations should happen in the United States. The case was brought here, and they should

happen in person.

So the plaintiffs have filed a motion seeking permission to have that, those Rule 35 examinations, proceed by telemedicine or, in any event, to waive the requirement of being in person. They point out, essentially, I think, three issues with having them in the United States.

The first is that they say that in order to come to the United States, obviously, the individuals who are in China need a visa. And they say that although they applied for a visa, it looks like in November, that it is — that the wait time is listed as 999 days from the US Embassy and that that suggests — and that the information coming out of the Embassy is that only emergencies are being authorized, and they just may not get a visa in time to comply with the Rule 35 examination.

The second issue they point out is that they have to leave China. There are exit requirements governing leaving China.

The third issue is, then, of course, there's -- if I have the rules right, that described by the plaintiffs, there's a 14-day waiting period to come to the United States, at the conclusion of which you need a negative PCR COVID test within three days of flying here. So there's a risk that they could get a visa, do what they need to do, they would be all on track, and they might contract COVID while they're

doing the 14-day waiting period outside of China because the 14-day period doesn't apply to them while they're in China. They have to be somewhere else to engage in the 14-day waiting period.

So I have these -- these comments with respect to that. One is, I think the defendants need to respond to that motion. I think that the plaintiffs have raised reasonable and fair issues with respect to the requirement to be in the United States. Those -- I will note that -- well, so, yes, I think those things, you need to respond to that motion because I can't fully evaluate that without a response. That's a pending motion before the Court.

While it's true that I said it had to happen in the United States, they've raised for me facts that weren't -- some of those facts may have been swirling about or even in some ways before me, but they've put them before me in a much clearer way and I think that I need to consider those and I want to hear from the defendants with respect to those.

I think particularly the question of getting a visa is obviously a significant issue. They can't come to the United States without a visa. And I'm not expecting them to come to the United States in violation of the laws of the United States, and so that's a significant thing.

I will tell you, just aside, it wasn't crystal clear to me that the document you attached as the Chinese

exit requirements prohibits -- or treats foreign litigation as a nonessential activity. But even if they can leave China, they still need a visa.

And there's the other issue. So I do think that there are two separate questions raised by the motion, one is coming to the United States, and one is in-person evaluations. And you sought both, which is fine. And I highlight that, because I think about them, depending on what defendants tell me, I might think about those things differently.

I can see -- one thing, there are -- telemedicine existed before COVID, and as you point out in the papers, has become widespread since and has been used quite successfully in a variety of ways. And that, you know, certainly is facts that you've put before the Court, the plaintiffs. That said, there are certain things that are -- that telemedicine isn't as effective at as in-person examinations.

And so I separate those two, because I can see the potential for in-person examinations, even if they didn't happen in the United States. But of course an in-person examination outside of the United States involves all sorts of expense issues and terms. You have to send the expert to wherever the sort of, quote, neutral country or the third country is that you can do it, or you might have to find an expert in that county. That could be problematic.

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So I think that what I would say about that motion is this: I think that there are -- notwithstanding the statements I made, there are -- seem to be, at least facially from reading just one side's papers, there seem to be real questions about the ability of these plaintiffs to come to the United States, and that's an issue. And I'm not going to -- if they -- if they are diligent in attempting to come to the United States, I'm not going to dismiss their claims or bar certain damages, because they didn't violate the -they didn't -- they didn't hire someone from Massachusetts to stuff them into a box, as has been alleged in another case, and secret them inside a train and then on a private jet and land them in the United States for an in-person examination, in violation of all sorts of international and United States I'm not expecting that the plaintiffs do that in order to comply with my order. In fact, I would be unhappy if they did that to seemingly comply with my order. So those are -like that's an issue.

On the other hand, I think that it's — the reason that I said "in-person" was because I thought this was the kind of case where in-person is important. And you know, what am I going to do when I see what the defendants say? I don't know. I want to see what they say. That's why we have an adversary process, because I hear both sides and then I might want to talk to you again.

What I'm really saying, I guess, counsel for the defendants, is they raised a real issue with respect to getting out of the -- China and into the United States, and I need you to respond in order to evaluate that.

And one of the points I was trying to make in my order about coming to the United States was that they did bring the case here. They are going to have to come here for the trial, and I think they're going to have to be here for the trial.

And another thing you should consider, while it's true we have authority to have you all by Zoom now, I don't believe I had authority, prior to the CARES Act, which was enacted in the weeks following the onset of the COVID pandemic back in March of 2020 -- I don't think I had authority to conduct proceedings by Zoom. So they -- it is a civil case, not a criminal case. We ought to think about that. That's why I said they will have to come to the United States. And so obviously Rule 35 is not the trial, but so there are practical issues there. I need a response from the defendants with respect to that issue.

But to recap, from my perspective where we are, the written discovery served by the plaintiffs in December 29th, that's a nullity. If you want to serve written discovery, you need to file a motion for leave to serve written discovery. The only discovery — at this point, there's no

discovery, except the Rule 35 process and the expert -- the remaining expert disclosures and expert depositions. I think any other discovery, other than supplementing, as your duties ordinarily require, requires permission.

The expert report that was served is the expert report that defendant -- plaintiffs and their counsel served. That's their expert report. That's the one the defendants respond to. That's the one that's in the case. If you want to have another expert report and supplement, you're going to have to come and file the motion and explain to me why you should be allowed to file it late. And I'll read that motion and consider it. But the one thing we're not going to do, just so that there's no misunderstanding is, like --

Well, is it true that -- it doesn't really matter. I won't ask that.

But the fact of the matter is that you came into the case in November. In December, you filed a motion, and the motion was to change the remaining schedule. I don't view this as an opportunity -- you may like everything Mr. Joffe did, or you may not like everything Mr. Joffe did; you may like some of what he did, or some of what he didn't do. There are some cases where it might be appropriate to go back and redo things. But this is an old case with substantial litigation; I didn't think it was appropriate at the time to do it sua sponte. You didn't ask for that. You

asked for just changing what remained. That's what we're doing.

We have a definite trial date, which itself is a substantial extension in an old case from what was a definite trial date. I intend to stick to that trial date. I think it makes sense. I think there's a public interest in resolving this case and that trial date. No one has given me any reason why I should continue it. I can't -- I'm not saying never, because one should never say never, but short of that, I don't see any reason I'm changing the trial date. We're going forward with this carefully, tightly integrated schedule. If you want to do something different, file a motion.

Any questions about that?

MR. SASO: Your Honor, this is Paul Saso for Gibbons. I have just one, I think, logistical question for you.

With respect to the plaintiffs' motion to permit remote medical exams, that was filed about a week and a half ago, late, about 10:00 p.m. Friday afternoon, we want -- and plaintiffs may very well assent to this, and I just have not raised it with them yet. Our opposition would be due this Friday. We wanted to hear from you first to see, since we thought that this was already decided, whether you wanted full briefing. And I would just see if Your Honor or the

plaintiffs would be okay with extending that to just simply next Tuesday or Wednesday.

MR. NIKAS: Your Honor, we filed it two months in advance, so we could get this all resolved in time, the issue of remote. So I have no objection to an extension. This is, of course, a question of whether Your Honor has enough time to resolve these issues.

THE COURT: Yes, I'll be able to resolve it quickly.

Tuesday or Wednesday, which would you want?

MR. SASO: I guess I'd always like Wednesday.

THE COURT: Close of business Wednesday.

I'll tell you what I'm interested in most. I'm interested in like the questions -- I'm interested in the practical questions. Okay. Can they get out of China and come to the United States? And is that -- is that reasonably possible or not? And if it's not reasonably possible and you want me to hold them to coming to the United States when it's not reasonably possible, you need to explain to me how that's right. Or if -- because I can't see how that would be right. Or if they're incorrect, in fact, it is reasonably possible for them to come to the United States, then explain how. Or you know, that's one question.

And the second is, like, what about the telemedicine? And I understand why it might not be as good,

but -- and if they can't come to the United States, but they can go somewhere else, do you want that? What about that? And so the -- like in my mind, that's what I'm thinking of: Can they come to the United States? If they can't come to the United States -- they certainly can leave China; they're not under any order to remain in China. Can they go somewhere else and can you do your examination there? I understand that's not ideal; it involves a lot of expense and -- but could you or would you want that? Or can we do telemedicine, or what do you think about that? Or is there some other alternative that I haven't thought about?

That's why I want a response. Because they put an issue in my mind, the question of whether they could really get here. And they had applied, from their exhibit, before I even issued my order in December and so — for a visa. So that's what I'm thinking about. And if you want to say other things or more things, or other things that are appropriate, I tell you in particular that's what I'm wondering about.

MR. SASO: No, Your Honor, I think that that's very helpful in terms of guidance in terms of responding. We're happy to show Your Honor that in fact the plaintiffs are capable of traveling here and obtaining a US visa. The State Department website that they cite to, if you simply look for different cities where you can go in order to obtain or schedule an interview, you can get that in far less than

999 days. They seem to have randomly selected cities like Moscow and Mexico City, where apparently it is difficult. But you could go to places like Hong Kong or Vietnam and get an interview with the US Embassy in less than a week.

And the only other thing in terms of preview, Your Honor, is that this issue is one that is not one that is no fault of their own; this is an issue that was addressed over a year ago, when we began to ask their plaintiffs' prior counsel, Mr. Joffe, what steps have the overseas plaintiffs taken to start the process of obtaining a visa, back in November of 2019. We also brought the visa issue to Your Honor's attention in February of 2020 and discussed it with you at a conference on March 10th of 2020, where you encouraged the plaintiffs to take all steps then necessary to obtain those visas.

So it may be true that they first decided to do that on November 6th of 2020, but that was when their -- the then-current deadline to get to the United States for their medical exams was November 13th. And so they decided to, for the very first time, apply for a Chinese visa one week prior to the deadline for them to arrive here. Now, we, you know, sort of resurrected that possibility by adding four-and-a-half additional months for them to get here, through -- from November 13th to April 1st.

But I don't think that we should look at overseas

plaintiffs as having no fault in this process. We've been persuing this for at least a few months with the plaintiffs. They knew that they needed to apply for these visas, and they simply decided not to.

THE COURT: I will look at all that. I'm not weighing in on it. But that's why we have an adversary process, and I will look at that and consider that and then evaluate it.

What I would say -- since this might come up, I will just short-circuit it. It's possible, plaintiffs, you might want to file a reply. I don't know and -- but I could imagine that you might want to. So you don't have to file -- if you want to file a reply to that motion, you don't have to file a motion for leave to file a reply, you can just file a reply, as long as the reply is five pages or less. If you want more than five pages, then you need to come to me for permission, because ordinarily a reply ought to be five pages or less, especially on a motion like this.

And so I could -- do you think you're reasonably likely, Mr. Nikas, to want to file a reply?

MR. NIKAS: I do, Your Honor. I think five pages is certainly going to be enough, given what I just heard Mr. Saso say. So I think five page is fine, and I won't ask for leave but I would appreciate the opportunity.

THE COURT: So when -- why don't I set a deadline,

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just so that then I won't decide the motion until I get the
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     reply, or once I --
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               How much time do you think you'll need to file a
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     reply? He's going to file his by close of business next
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     Wednesday.
               MR. NIKAS: If I could file -- if he's going to
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     file the --
               THE COURT: 6:00 p.m. Wednesday, he'll file.
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               MR. NIKAS: 6:00 p.m. on the 17th.
               If I could have the 22nd, say by 6:00 p.m., as
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     well, Monday.
               THE COURT: Monday. Okay. Fine. So reply by the
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     17th, and then Monday the --
               MR. NIKAS: 22nd.
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               THE COURT: -- 22nd. Right. Okay. Monday the
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     22nd, close of business, for reply.
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               All right. Anything else?
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               MR. NIKAS: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you very much.
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     Stay healthy. Have a good day. We're adjourned.
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               THE DEPUTY CLERK: This matter is adjourned.
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                (Court in recess at 4:10 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER I, Rachel M. Lopez, Certified Realtime Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, the foregoing pages are a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Dated this 18th day of February, 2021. /s/ RACHEL M. LOPEZ Rachel M. Lopez, CRR Official Court Reporter